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OPTilvLAL RESOLTRCE J:v!A'N • .'.i,GENIEI\'T UNDER 
CO:\DITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY: T:f.IE CASE OF 
AN OCEA>T FISHERY 
Tl'acy R. Lewis 
'The opEm;;.l man2-gement of a nc..tur2J 1·esource under 
stoci12sti.c c0nditions is analyzed in genCral tcrn1s, and with sp'eciiic 
appli.c:-,tion to �ic_c Easte rn Pacific Yellowfin htna fishery. Uncertain­
ties about (1 i the cu.rrent ;c,nd future sizo oi t'C>.e re·.oource, and (2} ·.;he 
rr,ar�et valcie. of the resource: <<11.d the cost of ext1·achng it, exist due 
to v<.1·:atlons in cconorr.ic ccnd environrnental conditions. A Markov 
D2cision Process rn.odel of the resource is developed to find optirnal 
policies that lYiaximi-1.e the discounted stream of expected social 
ret,�rns from resource use. In addition, the model is used to answer 
these questions: How do optin·,al progran1s for allocating resour.ces 
fr, a dc:terrr,inistic cnvironi-nent con":.pare with optin;al programs under 
stocha�tic conditions'? Do different attitudes toward social risk 
bearing as regards variations i.n resource· rents have an effect on 
o;itirr.al decision rules? 1.\rhat is the effect of increased uncertainty 
about resource pric"es, extraction costs, and resource growth and 
depletion rates on optimal P'-·ograms. 
OPTIJ:vlAL RESOURCE M:...t..NAGEMENT UNDER 
CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY: THE CASE OF 
AN OCEAN FISHERY 
Tracy R. Le\vis 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For the lnost part, studies of optimal management policies 
for both rene\vable and nonrenewable resources have been done unC:er 
detern1inistic condition;;. 1 Generally these analyse s assume a \vorld 
in which all current and future demands, pr.ices, ar,d costs are kr.ov.;n, 
in which the current reserve of the resource can be observed and 
measured exactly, in whi.ch environmental facto1·s affecting the 
g
_
rowth or deterioration- of the resource are either unimportar:t O!' 
are perfectly predictable, and in which the entire time path of re-
serves and extraction rates can be calcUlated with certainty for a 
giveri program of resource management. Ir. reality, of course, 
there is not only uncertainty regarding current and future resource 
prices, as well as the effects of environmental changes on. resource 
stocks, but also there is often uncertainty about !:he existing supply 
of the resource available for extraction. Determir.istic models have 
2 
Corn.inated the literature thus far not because the elernents of uncer­
tainty are unimportant or because they have gone unrecog nized, 2 but 
beciil!se existing stochastic models are either not operable or too 
difficult to work 'vith. The purpose of this study is to initigate some 
a·f the deficiencies in the literatu:!:"e by i ntroducing and analyzing a 
general model of resource mar.agement that readily incorporates 
various aspects of uncertainty. 
A. D<:scrintion of thP. l'Aodel 
L--.. our mod.cl the resource, whether it be a fishery, a mineral 
deposit , an oil reserve, etc., is controlled by a hypothetical social 
n-:anager. It is assumed that the manager chooses the rate of extrac­
tion ir. each period to rr,z.ximizc the expected social utility of the 
strean1 of econornic rents from the resource. Although we are inter­
es�ed in socially opti1nal behavior, the model is also appropriate for 
describing resource use for diiferent rnarket and allocation systems .. 
Eler::i.ents of unce rtainty w.ay be accorrnnodated in the analysis in the 
following forms: ( 1 )  Uncertainties may exist about the current size of 
the 'resource either becau se of difficulties in observing and measur­
in{T the re: source .stock as in the case of fisher ies or because of 0 ' ' ' 
the possibilities of finding new reserves through exploration, aS in 
th!:: case of minerals and oil; (2) the mar!<:et pTice of the r·esource 
rnay var y due to fluct-uati�r.s in consumer demand and the availa­
bility of substitutes. The costs of extracting ihe resource may also 
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be random; (3) unpredictabl e changes in the envtronment may perturb 
the natural rate of growth or deteriora.tion of the resource as well as 
the effective rate of depletion by rnan. For exaw.ple, variations in 
the weather and the tem perature of the water ma;r have an effect on 
the natural growth rate of a fish population and the rate at which the 
fish are caught. 
The optimizing technique for this analysis, developed by 
:Howard (1960} is an application of dynamic programn1:ing hl 2. discrete 
time and finite state and action Markovian process n1odel. The dynan1ic 
structur e  of the resource extraction program is described in terms oi a 
simple, one-period Markov process model \Vith a finite nu1nber of states. 
In its most. basic scalar form a state is simply a possible size of the 
resource stock; in more ccimplicated vector fo1·rns a state =i ght contai:'.l 
information on the size of the stock, the season of the year, pre­
Vailin-g econom�c and political conditions, etc. During a particular 
time interval, the program is in a certain state if it is described by 
the value of all the variables that define the state. A state transition 
occurs when its describing variables Change frolu the values speci-
fied for one state to those specified for another. Movements from 
one state to another, described by the transition probabilities are 
random as a result of variations in environmental and sqcio-
economic conditions affecting the natural growth and depletion of the 
4 
resou<ce. Thus, the transitior, probabilities in the sirnplest scalOl" 
form depend 0.:-1 the g::-owth of the stock (which is irnportant in the 
case of renewable resources), and on the rate of extraction, 
With the states and tra:1sition probabilities fully specified, 
the !T',anager regulates the use of the resource over time to maxi-
mize the expected social utility of the stream of iuture rents f!'OlU 
th·:i reserve. ll is assum·�d that there arc a finite number of pos-
sible extraction rates in each period for the manager to select from. 
Tnis typ'� of forn1ulation t'c3ults in a sequential optimiz.ation problem 
ti�at is solved tr dynaP.1ic programxning.
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B. .:'.::.:.'.alysis o f the lV:_odel 
The n'.odel is uscC to sh1dy the effects of l:lncertainty on optimal 
decision rv.les for the allocation of natural ::-Psourccs over time. 1-i 
parHculat', we £0..: us on th.8 f0Uov1ing questions: How do optimal pro-
grams for allocating resources in a deterministic environment cornpare 
vrith optimal programs derived under stochdstic conditions? Do deter-
mini�tic decis!on rules serve as a good approxin1ati.on for optin1al 
stochastic progrii:rns? How do different attitudes for risk bearing with 
·regards to variations in rc�-:ource rents affect optimal decision ru�es? 
Is the usual practice of representing· the "riski...'1ess" of a project in 
terms of the social discount ro.te appropriate for use ir. stochastic 
sequential maxi.miza.tion problems such as ours? Vfhs.t is the effect 
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of increased uncertainty about consumer demand, and resource grov;rth 
and depletion rates on optimal programs? 
An analysis of the questions posed abO'Je are applied to a 
study of a specific renewable resource, the Eastern Pacific yellow-
fin tuna fishery. Because the resource can replenish itself, rnodels 
of renewable resources generally a1·e more complex than models of 
nonrenewable resources. Thus, although the study pertains to fish-
eries, our model is easily modified for an.1lyzing nonrene,wable 
resource problems. 
Apart from demonstrating the use of our model, the purpose 
of this study is to generate some practical policy recommendations 
for the management of the Eastern Pacific yellowfin tuna fishery. 
The fishery is not only important as a food source, but it also pro-
vides incomes for fishermen from the United States, Canada, Japan, 
and several South and Central Ame:-ican countries.
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C. Plan of the Study 
The plan for this paper is as follows: in Section II the optimal 
allocation of the fishery resource is described in terms of a finite state 
and action Markovian decision process. First, changes in the fishery 
stock as a function of natural gro-wth and depletion are specified. The 
economic0characteristics.of the yellowfin tuna fishery are described 
and the problem of dealing with the risk in fishery rents is discussed. 
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Next the optimal ;;.lloce..tior. of the fishery resource is iorJ.nulated as 
a discrete dynamic programming problem. A list of the various allo-
cation prograrns to be considered under various conditions of uncertainty 
in the fishery is provided. Finally, certain limitations of the model 
al.-8 discussc:d and sui;;gestions for extensions are made. 
In Section III optimal allocation policies are presented that 
correspond to various conditions of uncertainty about the econornic 
2.nC biological processes in the fishery. The effects oI increasing 
uncertainty in consur.r.er cien1a::i.d and population growth rates on optimal 
allocation ?rograms are assessed. Different attitudes �or risk bearing 
are analyzed for their impact on opt�tnal programs, and the prospects 
for being able: to represent risk via the discount rate are excim.ined. 
Areas requiring additio::1al <e:mpirical research are icl<intified. The 
paper is concluded with a br·Lef summary aTI.d discussion of results.· 
IL ::-A.t., REOV 110DEL 
A. Growth Characteristics oi the Resource 
The size of the fishery stock at some time t + l equals the 
stoc'.-c at time t enhanced by the amount 0£ natural gTowth during that 
. period minus the amount extracted by man. Thus we assume 
x
t+ i 
xt + r:l t'Kf(xt) - n2t -z.·Lt: (1 I 
wh.zre x, 
L
t 
f(X
t) 
I 
7 
stock at time t (measured in physical units) 
expected catch rate at time t 
expected 1·ate of change in the stock due to 
natural growth 
length of each time period 
n1e
rizt= nonnegative multiplicative random variables, 
independently distributed through ti.me v;ith 
stationary density functions h1 (·ri1) and h2( T]2) 
and expected val ues C:.('r'1,1):::: e(r12)""' 1.  
With respect to ocean fisheries, ri1 t represents fluctuations in \Vater 
temperature and in the availability of preditors and prey that "''ould 
alter the natural growth of the stock, and 'lzt meo.sures the effect of 
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varying envi:;;onmental conditions on the effective catch rate. 
Defining E
t 
as a composite input variable representing the 
capital and labor used in fishing at time .t, 
L
t 
g(X
t, 
E
t) 
(2) 
where g( ) is a production function for landing fish. The stock X
t 
enters production essentially as a capital·input, which 'Nhe::1 combined 
with the variable input, Et' yields a flow of resource consumption . 
We assume 
ag a £.g_ 0 
a;-{ :'.:. 0; ax aE !:'.. (3) 
reflecting the increased difficulty of harvesting the resource as it 
becomes more scarce. 
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The Schaefer Stock Production model (see Schaefer [1957]), 
which is used for describing the population dynamics of the yellowfin 
tuna, provides us with specific fu..'1.ctional forms for f(X
t
) and g(Xt' Et). 
According to a stochastic Ciscrete tin1e version of this model suggested 
by Pella and Tomlinson (1969) 
f(Xti "' 
(a - bXt)Xt a,b > 0 (4) 
Lt "' g(Xt' Et) "' kX E t t k > 0 15 I 
X. 1 = X + [111 (a - bX )X - 11 kX E J"Z t+ t t t t 2t t t (6) 
'Nhcrc !::.. = . 1  year is the length of each time.interval. In equation (4} 
the expected rate of natural growth increases for (0 <. X < a/Zb) is 
maximized at x = a/2b (referred to as the n1aximu�n sustained yield 
population) and decreases for (a/2b < X < a/b) as depicted in Figure 1. 
The maximum sustainable pOf;ulation is given by X = a/b. 
f)X) I 
CD 
a/2b a/b X 
Figure. i. Population Gro·wth Curve 
Equation (S) describes a "mass contact" fishing tech�"lology where 
the catch rate is proportional to the physical contact bet\veen the fish 
and fishing effort, E. Th_e constant, k, is called the "catchability 
coefficient" and is the percent of the total fish popu.lation removed 
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by one unit of effort. Equation {6) describes the changes in the popu-
lation allowing for random variations in the growth ;i.nd catch rates 
that are specified in equations (4) ar.d (5) respectively. The distri"!:iutions 
for ri1 and r12 will be described in greater detail in Section IL E. 
Estimates for the population parameters, a, b, and k, that 
are based on histoi·ical time series data for catches and effort, and 
were provided by the Int�r-American Tropical Tuna Commission are 
listed in Table 4 on page 27. Details of the estimation procedure are 
described in Pella and Tomlinson (1969). 
B. Economic Characteristics of the Resource 
In each time period the flow of rent or net social returns from 
resource use is 
R(Xt' Et) = G
(r)2g(Xt, Et
)) - C(Et
) (7) 
where G(ri2g(Xt, Et
})= the total revenue and consumer su.rplus 
as a function of the actual amount of the 
resource harvested, 
C(E I ' the total cost of Et. 
In general, changes in consumer demand, in the availability of· 
substitutes, and in environmental conditions msy cause the functions 
G( ) and C( to be stochastic. Consequently, R(X , E) may vary with t t . 
changes in the amou.nt harvested (for a given E) and/ or with changes 
in the revenue and <.:?st functions, In the case of the tuna fishery v,·e 
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will allow for variations in price while assuming costs are nonrandom. 
Fer Eastern Pacific yello\vfin tun<:< "1.ve found prices v..rere 
6 
in,;ensitive to the quantity of tuna purchased. This is because the 
price of t..ina is determined on the world market, and the quantity of 
yellowfin taken from the Eastern Pacific is only a small fraction of 
the total world supply of tuna. Consequently we assume 
G(r,2g{Xt' Et)
);;; G(r;2kXtEt) 1Yr12kXt·Et (8) 
where p i.s the pri.ce per pound for unprocessed tuna.· 
'Ne \v0r�" unable to obtain the necessary cost d;;..ta from boat 
owners in orcl<':r to estimate C(Et). 7 Therefore ·we have assumed 
th:c-ee hypothetic;d specific<ttions for C(Et) enabling us to study the 
eifect of differe:it cos:t conditions on opti.1n2.l resource use. The first 
of t1:iese specifications is 
C{Et) = 0 (9a) 
'1.+.ere '.:he cost of effort. is �ssumed to be zero. Although this sp,ecifi-
cation is not representative of cost conditions in the yellowfin fishery, 
it is included here for general interest. Equation (9a) >nay be a good 
appryximati.on for a sports fis!-iing ind;.;.stry where people fish for the 
sake of enjoy-rner.t and relaxation. 
The second specification is 
C(E ) = ClE + c E 
2
; clc2 > 0 t t 2 t (9b) 
where costs increa;;e more'than proportionately with the amount of 
effort. This may result i[ the n)iniinum earningS needed to attract 
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labor and capital at the margin rises as more of these inputs are cm-
ployed in fishing, or if there are cro\vding and congestion exterr,alities 
connected with large-scale fishing. 
The third specification is 
C(E ) = C3E 
l/Z; G.., > 0 t t .:> (9c) 
where average and marginal costs decrease with greater alloc<>.tions 
0£ effort. This may occur if there are economies of scale in the pro-
vision of fishing effort, or if there are gair.s in efficiency dµe to infor-
mation sharing as the number of fishing ve5sels increases. 8 
In all of these specifications the fixed costs of effort are zero. 
The large purse seiners 9 that dominate fishi.ng in the Eastern Pacific 
are quite rnobile and can operate in numerous fisheries throughout the 
world. Because of the availability of other species in the same area, 
such as the skipjack, and the easy access to other fishing grounds, the 
fixed costs of fishing for yellowfin in the Eastern Pacific are minimal. 
Combining the revenue and cost for1nulations in (8) and (9) we 
obtain three possible spc:cifications for R(Xt, Et) given by
R(Xt, Et) 
pri2kXtEt 
2 
P11zkXtEt - cl Et -
C2Et 
l /2 
PYlzkXtEt - C3Et 
(1 Oa) 
(lOb) 
(10c) 
each of wKich will be analy:?.ed to determine the effects of different 
cost conditions in the fishery on optimal resources management. 
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C. Evalua_tion of Risks 
The net social benefit from the use of a natural resource will 
r.iepend on soc£ety1s attitude toward variability in economic returns. 
The approach tc..kcn in this paper is that the risk attitude of individuals 
i� importt,nt in deterrnining risk preferences of society. lt is generally 
accepted that individuals are not indifferent to risk and that investors 
nLust be paid a :'risk premium" yield abovo the expected rate of return 
"'-': cornpensativ::-i fo;_· the costs of risk bearing. 
Acceptir. g the fact that private risk aversio:l exists, the major 
iss-...i.e with respect to evaluating p1,;.blic projects in gen(':ral and the 
management of a resource in particular, is if the private cost of risk 
beiiring represents a social cost as well. This 'Nill depend on the 
extent to which the returns from separate public projects can be "pooled" 
toget11er (see Sarr.uelson [1964] and Vickrey [1964]) and how extensively 
the risks from the project, are spread among individuals in the economy 
(sec Arrow and Lind [i.970]). lO 
The actual distribution of risks and the attendant cost of risk 
bearing will depend largely on the structUre of the management program. 
Economists have proposed nuinerous systems for resource management, 
i."lcluding the imposition of taxes and subsidies on resource uS.e, the sale 
of extraction licenses, and placing direct quotas and limitations on 
resource production. Each of these schemes results in a different 
distribution of the economi.c rents. A general theory of natural resource 
13 
allocation under uncertainty should allow for averse and neutral attitudes 
toward risk, depending on the institutional structure of the management 
program. 
In selecting the optimal policy for resource use, we assume 
the manager chooses Et 
to
maximize 
E t 
; BteU(R(Xt' Et))3"; B t=::Q 
1 'l+P ;  9 > 0 ( 11) 
where p is the riskless interest rate, <J.nd eU(R) is the certainty equiva-
lence of the possible econon1ic rents frorrc the resource at time t. The 
social attitudes towardS risk in resource rents is represented by the 
form of the social utility functior. U(Rt). Strict concavity in the utility 
function implies risk aversion, while risk neutrality occurs if U(Rt) is 
a linear function. 
In taking this approach to resource management, ·we abstract 
from several issues which Should be inentioned, First, the problems 
associated with '\group decision n1aking" are subrnerged behind our 
assumption of a single resource manager who makes allocation decisions 
11 
for society. Second, in maximizing the expected utility of the stream 
of rents from the resource we abstract fro;;n other possible goals of 
economic policy such as attaining high employment, acquiring a favorable 
balance of payments position, etc. Vlhile these are important issues 
pertaining to resource management, a proper treatment of'these prob-
lems is beyond the scope of this study. 
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In analyzing n1anagement programs for the yellowfin ti;;.na 
:ishery two speci_fications of the uti.lity functions are assurned: 
U(R) R ( l2a) 
U(R) ln (R + G); G 4.5x 108. (l 2b) 
Due to the curvatur·e of these functions (l 2a) reflects a risk neutral 
attitude and (12b} exhibits a risk averse attitude towc..rd variability 
in the returns from the fishery. The natural log function in (12b} was 
chosen because it is easy to work with computationally. In stochastic 
models where v2.riations in rents occlir, it is possible for R 'to be 
negative. To insure tha.t ln (R + G) exists, the constant G is specified 
to be large enough such that R + G > 0 for all possible values of R. 
The procedure for deterrninir,g G is discussed in Lewis ([1975]
pg. 102-103). 
The hvo utility specific.ations in(: 2a)-(12b) combined \vith" 
the various forms of the rent function we have prese::-ited in (10.a)-(lOc! 
yield the six cla.sses of objective functions appearing i:i Table I. The 
analysis that follows \Vill be carried through for each of these six 
cla:ssos. Each function is characterized by cost conditions in the 
fishery as •.vell as the social attitudes to>.;,·ard risk b..':aring that exist. 
Table 1. Classes of Objective Functions 
Function 
pkXtEt 
pkXE - C E  -C E2 t t  l t  2 t  
kX E - C El/Z p t t 3 t 
ln {pkXtEt +G) 
z 
ln{pk..'CtEt - C1Et - c2Et +G) 
1 /Z ln(plUCtEt-.C3Et +G) 
D. A Discrete Markov Decision Precess Model 
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C lass 
II 
Ill 
IV 
v 
VI 
The economic and b'iological charc.cteri_stics of the fishel"y 
have been examined in Section II. A - II. C. Our next task is to develop 
a decision process for finding the optimal allocatio:-i program for the 
resource where programs are chosen to: 
maximize 
E t 
subject to: 
00 
t -;!:; BeU[R(X,E)J6 
t=O t t 
xt+l = xt + /;.[ril t(a - bXt)Xt - 112tkXtE,t) 
Assume the resource is described by a finite number of states, 
Xj, for i�= 0, 1, 2, ... , 30. Each state corresponds to a cerlain population 
size given by X
i = i x  107 pounds. x0 
represents the minimum stock of 
0 pounds, and x30 is the largest population. The parameter estimates 
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of Table 4 indicate a ma;..:irr.um sustainable stock of 29.4 x 107 pounds 
7 so that x30 = 30 x 10 pounds is large enough to include all probable 
values of the population. Since the Tropical Tuna Commission generally 
tr�.es to niaintain the stock at a level producing the maximun1 s1.1stained 
yi81d, the current population is probably �n the neighborhood of 15 x 107 
12 
pounds. 
In each time period, depending on the. state of the resource, the 
resou·rce manager can choose from among a finite nunl.ber of possible 
effort allocations denoted by E.n' The "i" refers to the state occupied 
' 
by the resou:::-ce. The rate ol ef:fort is de:aoted by 11m" \vhere 
. n1 E
m+ 1 
d Mi . h · m "' 0, l, 2, .. . , 1\ with E
i 
< 
'i 
, an Ei 
being t e maximum 
e.Uort expended in state i. These rates of effort are measured in terms 
of standardized bo<�t days at sea l)e1· year and range in rnultiples of 250 
fro�u a minirnun1 of 0 days to a maxin1um 8.rnount determined by 
economic conditions. 13 
The model vie use £or describing the population dynarr.icS of 
the fishery i.3 a Hsimple" or "or.e period" Markov process. The 
probability of making a transition to each state of the process depends 
on the state presently occupied and the management policy employed. 
A policy is a rule :or selecti.ng effort in each state. The transitions 
occur at regular discrete time intervals. Suppose at time t, Xt = Xi 
for some i, and policy cl is being utilized. For simplicity we will 
assume that policy d selects the "dth'1 effort rate in each state. 
Then according to equation (6) 
_,.. dl 
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xd t+ 1 X. + 6.Ll�1(a - bX.)X. -112kX.E. j for all i = 0, 1 ,  2, • • •  , 30 1 l 1 l l (13} 
By knowing the probability density functions for n1 and 112 and using 
equation (13) it is possible (see Lewis [1975], pp. 33-39) to calculate 
the transition probability that the resource n1oves from state i to 
state j under policy d; denoted by p� . for all i, j, and d. '· J 
Let V. d(N) be tl:e expected social value from the resource 
' 
obtained with policy d given that there are :\' per:ods left in the planning 
horizon and that the resource begins in state i. It is defined by 
given 
[N-1 l V 
i
d
(N) = e 
t
�
O 
B'[ U(R(Et
d
' x,
d)i]i\J for all i= 0, 1, • •  , , 30 
XO"' Xi. 
It is possible to rewrite equation (14) in recursive form such that 
V.d(N) ' 
d 
qi + B I;p� .V _
d(N - 1 )  for all j l, J J i = 0, l, ... , 30 
where q.
d 
= ZU(R(E0
d
, X.
d
))is the immediate expected social return ' ' 
from the resource. The values of q. 
d will depend on the functional ' 
(14) 
( 15)  
form of U(R) (see Table 1) and the density functions for p and 112. 
Equation (15) means that the expected social value, V.d(N) is.equal to the 
. ' 
immediate expected retnrn qi
d 
plus the sum of discounted values of 
being in state j with N - 1 periods left, weighted by the probability 
1 8 
that the resource will occupy state j in the next tin1e period. Writing 
(l:i) in rr.atrix form yields 
'.vher-;;, 
V
d(N) = Od + BP
dVd(N - l)  
d d V (0:) is a 31x1 colurnn vector of the V
i 
(N)'s
d . di Q is a 31 x 1 colur:nn vector of the qi 
s 
I 16 I 
P
d 
is the ]IAarkov transition matrix corresponding to 
to policy d. 
d d ]· 
p "[p .. ' "J i, j 
0, l, 2, . • • . '  30. 
\Ve v:ant to consider a planning !-iorizon of indefinite db.ration 
for the resource. It can be sho\vn that (see Howard [1960] and Lewis 
[1975]} that 
li:rn Vd(l\') :: vd 
N-,oo 
(I - BPd)-lQd (1 7)
11 terms of this forrnulation the allocz,tion problen< for the resource 
manager is to fir,d the pf)li'Cy that maximizes Vd. Ross ([1969], 
pp. 119-24) demonstrates that an O?timal policy for this problem exists, 
that it is nonrandom and that the action it chooses depends only on the 
state of the process. Howa:cd (1960) has developed an iterative scheme 
14 
for iinding the optirh.::i.l policy \Vhich we have implemented in our study. 
For a complete description of tP.e computational techniques used to 
find optirr1al strategies, see Lewis {-1975, pp. 104-10). 
The model p1·esented here is intended to approximate conditions 
in the real \VOrld v:here of course a continuum of states and policies exist. 
19 
A control theory nl.odel Y.rhich assumes a continuous 11state variable" 
(population) and a continuous ''control variable'' (effort allocations) 
was employed to derive optimal allocation rules fo�· the fishery under 
detern1inistic conditions. These rules '-"·ere compared with the optirnal 
strategies obtained from the Markov decision model prese:i.ted here 
to determine the effects of discretizing the state and control variables. 
The Markov decision model performed quite well in that the solution 
yielded by the programming and control theory methods were nearly 
identical (see Lewis [1975], Chapter III). 
E. Specification of Cases 
Stochastic Variation 
The Markov model developed in Sections II. A - II. D will be
used to analyze optimal programs for resource inanagement under 
various conditions of uncertainty. The cases included in our study, 
listed in Table 2, q..re characterized by the kind of cost conditions for 
effort, by the types of stochastic variation in the economic and biological 
parameters, and by the social attitudes toward :r:isk assuni.ed in the model. 
For convenience we will refe1· to a particular program by the label 
corresponding to it in the table. The Rornan numerals in each 
label refer to the specification of the utility and rent functions, 
reflecting the cost conditions and attitudes to\vard risk bearing 
that prevail in the fishery. The letters indicate the type of 
stochastic variation in· the model, for which we assume there are 
20 
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four possibilities. In the yellowfin tuna and other fisheries fluctua-
ticns in the consumer demand and changes in the availability of sub-
stitute focd products cause the price of the resource to vary. To 
assess the im pact of these variations on resource allocation we con-
Sider cases where price is random , denoted by the letter P in the 
labels a ppearing in Table 2. Becaus@ of changes �n environmental 
cond�tions, the rate of fish landings (for a given allocation of effort), 
a:::i.d the natu�al rate of growth of the stock may fluctuate. Therefore, 
V.'e also include situatioros v.·her.:: the depletion rate is variab:e, de-
noted by �; where dc-.plction and growth rates are randon1 and com-
. pletely dcper,dent, denoted by DG; and "\vhcre they are independent, 
denoted b>'- :QQ_. Su:.:n1narizing, the programs listed in Table 2 
a.re derived by pc:r:1nuting each of the six specifications of U(R) with 
the four kinds of stochastic variation in the model. 
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Frequency Distrihutions for Randon1 Va_riables 
The f:-equency distributions for the random variables in our 
n1odel, price, pt, the depletion parameter, 11Zt' and the growth 
16 
parameter, T1lt' are not known because of a lack of data. There-
fore, we make the follcwing assumptions: _ti._,Jl random variables are 
distributed independently over time. For computational convenience, 
in the DG cases we assume ':l 
l 
and ri2 ar1'! identical. The expected 
value of the variabies is equa! to the value they assume under deter-
rn.inistic condi.tion3 with e(pt) = $0.15, and C:(TJ1)·= e(ri2l = 1. 
\Ye arc able to simt:!<i.te a rich variety of stochastic' conditions 
in the fishery by assuming that the variables have either a t"runcated 
triar..gular or uniform frequency distribution. Like the uniform dis -
tribution, the truncated triangular distribution is completely deter-
mined by the specification oi two range_ pararrJctcrs, assuming the 
distribution mean is fixed. For instanc.::, th.:o distriOution, h( 'llt
)
, 
!or Tl lt, an exaIT!p�e of which appears in Figure 2, is constrµcted 
in the following ma::-:ner: 
For all values of d1 and d2, _which specify the ra11ge 
of the distribution, with 0 :0: a1 < l < d2, thefre-
quency :function for T] l t  is completely determined Py 
the two conditions: 
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e,(T]lt) 
::: l {18a} 
h(d1l=O if \ (1 -d l)> (d2 -1) 
�h(d l) = 0 if 11 - 011 = (d2 -11 (18b) hldzl 
I 
h(d21 = o if ) 11 -d1i < ld2 -11 
The distribution is symmetric when {l - d1) ::: (d2 - 1) or skewed when 
the equality doesn't hold. Truncated tL·ianr,ula1· distributions £0:: the 
other two parameters, _Pt, and 
r>:Z.t <>.
re constructed similarly. }lope-
fully, determining the effect on resource alloc«.ti.on for different cEs-
tributions of pt, 'l"[lt, and
 112t 
will help to indicate what empirical 
information on these random variables is n.::eded for fishery mar.age-
ment. 
hi� I 
l lt 
I 
! 
__.-,< _,....,- I 
d l dz 
� lt 
Figure 2. Example of a Typical T.:-uncated Triangular 
Frequency Di<!tribution 
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To identify a particular program, we will refer to it by the 
appropriate label in Table 2 and include a description of sto-
chastic conditions that are i>imulated, Once the type of distribution 
is specified, only the "range parameters" art:: necessary to completely 
characterize the frequency function, For example, the label [I-D, 
Skd. L., (. 3, l. 2 l] denotes the case I-D where the distribution for the
depletion parameter, 11zt, is truncated triangular and skewed to the
le:ft with ri2t ranging between O. 3 and l. z·. All dist:ributions are
tru:-:icated triangulal', unless ''U'' a?pears in the description indicating 
a uniform ciistribution. Thus, (I-D, Sym .. U., (, Z, 1. 8l] refers to the
situation where the distribution for 'lz
t is symmetr'ic and uniform
With Tlzt ranging between O. 2 and 1. 8. 
For rhe re"-�'.er's convenience, a conLplete list and description 
of all the prograrns studieC. for each of tJ:le six specifications of the 
utility and rent functions appear'.S in Table 3. The same set of cases 
v:�re evaluated for all Clo;sscs I - VI of utility and rent functio�s. 
Three types of distributions, ske\ved left, skewed right, and symrnetric 
are included in our an<J.lysis. \Ve are ll'.-terested in determining i{ the 
optimal ccnsurnption policies are sensitive to the different types of 
distributions. For each kind of distribution, the programs '.1re 
arranged in increasing order according to the range of variation for 
the stochastic pararneters. As we will sec shortly, this allows us 
to study the effects of increased uncertainty on resource allocation. 
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For DG and DG conditions, only one range of variation is 
indicateC: s!nce we are assuming that T] lt and llzt have the sa.n1e 
26 
distribu:io!l.. Rc.>c.J.11 howcvc�x, that T] lt and T!zt a1·e identical for 
DG, and indepe'1.Gently distributed for DG. For DG programs, only 
uniform distributions are analyzed. The co.:;t of simulating DG condi-
ticns is more than fo::: t:he other cases because of the computational 
and memory storage de:nands on the computer in generating two inde-
peridently distributed random vari ables. Aft'er review.ing the other 
ca.ses we did r.ot f:nd that the optimal consi..cmption p.rogram for the 
skewed and syrnm�tric distributions were sufficiently different to 
Wi1rrant including both distributions in the DG progratns. 
Earlier, we stated that the probability density functions for 
the stochastic variables in our model, f]lt' 11zt' and pt are not 
known. Except for observations on p , there is also no information t . 
about the .rang(o over which these pararnetcrs vary. For the purposes 
oi our st"'..ldy, we assurne that e«ch of th1;: parameters vz.ries at its 
widest limits within a range of 0.2 acd 1 .8 its expected value. Although 
the price variation for sorne programs is greater tha::i the Huctuations 
in price commonly observed for the yellowfin tun<:. fishery (see Lewis [1975]). 
Appendix III-A), these cases are included in our analysis for general 
interest. 
The values for the rest of the parameters in the model are 
lis;;ed in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Biological P2.ram_:::ters 
a ::: 3.057 
b -8 1.03Sxl0 
k=7.85Xl0
-S 
Econoinic ParamLters 
P = e (pl = $0. ts 
C1=5.0xl0 2 
c2 ::: 6. 0 x 10 -2 
C., = 1.0xl0
5 
' 
B 0.9906 
G=4.Sx108 
�::: 0.1 
Values for the biological pai-<in1eters were provided by the 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. Foi· the economic param-
eters p is the mean price per pound for unprocessed yellovrfin tuna 
during the 1966-1972 period, expressed in terms of 1956 dollars. 
Since information on '\e cost of effort wa� not available, .programs 
corresponding to several sets of values for C1, C_, and C (including , " 3 
those in Table 4) were analyzed and found to be qualitatively similar. 
The value for B corresponds to an annual discount rate of 1 0 percent. 
rr 
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F .  Possible Extensions of  the lvfarkov Model 
fo_ the model presented in Sections II. A II. D, we have 
deliberately abstracted f:om certain corr.plexities in order to isolc..te 
the effects of uncertainty about prices and gro\vth and depletion rates 
or: optimal resource use,  Neve rthel e s s ,  our analysis is easily 
exte:ided to accom1nodate other factors that pres umably have an 
irnpc.ct on resource allocatio!"l. Generally this. involve s  expanding 
the dimensions of our state space. 
For exan1ple, the rate o f  growth of some resources, and the 
costs and revenues from resource extrc.ction may vary :with the season 
of fne year. To accou::lt for the s e  changes in our model each state 
c oLtld be characterized by the size of the stock as \vell as the season of 
the year. Then dependi.:g on the state, a particular growth equation 
for that season could be used to measu1·e stock changes, and season· 
spec ific cost and revenue f1,inctions could be employed to calculate 
profits. 1 7  
Another poss ibility is that several resources may b e  relatecl 
either physically or economically. The obvio1.1s exan-:ple occurs in 
ocean fisheries -..vhere different species which compete for food to 
survive are also econornically related as they are good substitUtes 
for each other in consu:rr.ption. \Vhe1·e a rnutual dependence between 
resource exists, a joint ff:anagement program i.':> nece,;; sax·y to achieve 
efficient resourc..:: use. To acco1nn1odate this possibility in our model 
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each state could be described by a vector of the s izes of each of the 
related resource stocks. Tnen in each period the rnanager would 
choose the rate of extraction for each resource to maximize joint 
1 8  
returns. 
The model can also be modified in other vvays to account 
for difficulties in observing the actual size of the resource (an obvious 
problein with fisheries) and to capture time trends in certain econo=ic, 
biological physical parameters of the system (see Lewis, pp. 39-45). 
A s  in the previous examples, these modifications o.re made by extending 
the dimension of the state space. L'l pri.nciple, o.ny process can be 
modeled if the states are appropriately defined. Hov.rever, there are 
limitations as to how elaborate the model can be made, since the 
computationai costs of s olving .for optimal policies increases rapidly 
as the s tate space is expanded. 
III. ALLOCATION POLICIES UNDER CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY 
JI, discussion of our results will be organized around a series 
of four questi.ons concerning the effects of uncerta�r.ty on optimal 
allocation policies. Before turning to these questions we will first, 
characterize the optimal allocation strategies for Clas s e s  I-VI and 
second, discuss the sensitivity of opti1nal programs to different 
stochastic specifications. 
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A .  _O,llocation Strate1i;ies 
Depending on the cost conditions in the fishery, optirnal 
polic:es are either of the steady-state variety or of the cvclical type. 
Th.:: l iterature on fisht;!ry managerrient has dealt almost exclusively 
With steady-state policies. As we shall see, this is because the 
economic rents from the resource are usually assumed to be a 
concaYe function of effort as is the case with Classes I, II, IV, and V.  
The notion of  a steady state becon1es obscured under sto-
c'nasti.c conditions when the population is p<:.rturbed constantly by 
randon1 variations in growth z.nd depletion r::i.tes. How
.
ever, looking 
2.t expected changes in the population we say that a steady- state fishing
str<c�0gy is c::ie for which tb.e stock converges (on average, or ignoring 
Yariat:cns in c;ro;vth ''nd C:cplotio;1 rates) to an equilibrium population 
o;1ze. Tbe dyr.;;.rnics of ihe sys ten1 are re.pres ented in Figure 3. 
0> "' 
x 
Figure 3 
x 
Population 
At X ., the expcctecl"natural growth �f the popu1atior, is exactly offset 
'by the expected harvest in· each period. x':' is the equilibrium popu-
lation i.n that (on average) for popu.lations X les·s (greater) than x�' 
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the stock is allowed to grow (is depkited) until X = x"�. As expected, 
X'� increases ·nith larger values of the discount factor, B. since it is 
desirable to harvest less of the resource the highel.· s ociety weights 
the consumption of future generations. \Vith Classes Ir and V, X;� 
varies directly with c2 as it becomes less  profitable to .fish for the 
resource as the cost of effort increas es.  Thia irnplies that x':< is 
larger for Class (II and V) programs than for Class {I and IV} prograr.ns .  
Our results indicate that the approach to equilibrium is rnore rapid 
for Class ( I  and IV) programs than it is for Class {II and V) programs. 
In contrast to steady-state fishing, the opti:rnal strategy for 
Classes III and VI is to fish 11cyclical.ly" in the follo\ving manner: 
for large populations, effort allocatior.s are large causing rapid deple-
tion of the stock. As the population decreases all fishing is stopped 
and the s tock. is allowed to grow until it reaches a :3uffic iently large 
size to begin the harvest once again. This type of "cyclical" fishing 
represented in Figure 4 takes advantage of the decreasing average cost 
of effort peculiar to Classes III and VI  by en1ploying large amounts of 
E whenever fish ar: harvested.t 
For larger values of C3 the fishing cycles are more pr_onounced.
The minimum population where fishing begins is larger along "<Nith the 
size of the harvest and the amount of effort employed. VVith larger 
va
_
lues of c3 the average. cost of effort at all levels of Et increases.
Consequently to produce at the same average cost it  is necessary to 
3 2  
err.ploy greater amour.ts oi effort resulting in larger harvests and 
greater fluctuations in the population, VV-ith smaller values of c3 
th.o: opposite occL�rs and fluctuations in the population are less  pronounced. 
Depletion Due 
to Harvest 
�t Region 
Growth Region � Population ........._ Growth ...____ 
Figure 4 
X Population 
M.ost management progran1s are based on ' 1steady state1' 
fishing. The theoretical basis for steady--state fishing comes from. 
the control theory analysis of optimal iishin;;; behavior. These models 
or.ly yield solutions for certain s1)ecifications of the rent function which. 
unfortunately p:·eclude the possibility of economies of scale in supplying 
e ffort. Our results suggest that cyclical .as opposed to steady-state 
fishing is optin1al for situations \vhere there are d<ecreasing average 
costs of supplying effort. Since there has been little estin1ation of 
cost fu::i.ctions for various fisheries, the 'case for steady-state fishing 
may have arisen partially because of the analytical convenience of 
assuming convex cost functions for use in control theo:i'Y analysis. 
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B. Sens itivity of Pror;;rams to Different Stochastic Sueciii.cations 
A comparison of the optimal strategies corresponding to the 
programs analyzed in Table 2 indicates that: 
Observation 1 :  Optimal effort allocations correspo::idL'1g to variable
depletion rate cases (specification D) are virtu.ally lmaffected by· 
allowing simultaneous variation in the natural growth rate (specification 
DO and DG). 
Conceivably, for the parameter values o.f 'Ti
lt  
and Tl
zt 
we
analyzed, fluctLtations in the depletion rate dominate any effects of 
growth rate variation. Another explanaticn might be that random 
changes in the growth rates have no impact on allocation programs. 
To test these hypotheses  \Ve analyzed programs where only the gro\vth 
rate was random for each of the six classes, assuming a variation for 
the parameter 'lllt ·of (Sym. U. [. 2, 1 .  8]). The optirnal effort allocations
for these programs differs only slightly from the deterministic pro-
gram for each class. This tends to confirm our hypothesis that 
variations in the growth rate have a negligible effect on allocation 
programs. 
Observation 2 :  The qualitative nature of our results i s  the same for 
all differ�t parameter distributions we employ, whether they be sym-
metri c ,  uniform symmetric, or skewed. 
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Although it docs not appear that the type of distribu.tion has 
a sig::J.ificant impact on resource allocation, \Ve will see that the an1ount 
of variation in the ::.-andorr, pararneters has a pronounced effect on 
optin1al decision rule s .  
C� Effects o f  ru.sk Bearin2 Attitudes o n  Optimal Harvestino- St:ratecries 
\\'e a1·e ::;.c,1,v ready to consider questions conce rning the effects 
of uncerta i.."1.ty on optilnal allocation policies. 
Ouesti(_,n l :  How do c'.ifferent attitudes toward social risk bearing, a s  
re6ards variations i n  resource rents, affect optimal decis ion rules 
when u:--,.ce rtainty exists regarding the price of fishery products, the 
rate of depletion (for a given cffori: allocation), and the rate of population 
growth? 
To answe.<:" Que stion 1, we contras t optimal decision rules for 
risk neutral (Cl2.ss I- Ill) progran1s \::.·it:'.J. risk averse {Class IV-VI) 
policies under ident:.cal stochastic conditions, far cases P, D, DG, 
ai.d DG, 0«.:.r results are summarized in. Obs ervation 3. 
Observation 3�: For all variations , P, D, DG, and DG listed in 
Tcble 3, a corr:pa ri.son of optirnal risk a.versa prog rarns \vit}]. risk 
neutral policies indicates that: 
a. .P..t small populatior.s the optimal allocation of effort and 
the resulting catch .for risk aver se programs are equal 
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to or larger than the corre sponding values for risk 
neutral policies. 
b. At large populations the allocation of e££ort and the result-
ing catch for risk averse progr2n:.s are gene rally less t:tan 
the cor;:esponding values for the risk neutral policies . 
c .  Except for Class III ar..d VI policie s , risk averse ar.d risk 
neutral programs converg e toward the same steady state 
population. 
Sample comparisons between risk neutral and risk averse 
policies for conditions where depletion rates are randon1 (D, Sym. U. , 
[. 6, 1 . 4])  appear in Figures 4-6. 1 9 Optimal policies are described by 
the effort to be allocated in �ach time period which depends only on 
the current population size. A s  a point of reference, levels of effort 
required to maintain the population at a steady state under deterministic 
conditions (Tl 1 = ri2 = l )  are traced out by the "Steady-State Effort Line. 
,.ZO
Thus the population tends to increase (decrease) for e£fort l evels lying 
below (abov e )  the ste::.dy-state effort line. 
Parts { a )  and {b) oi Observation 3 are explained by what we 
call the !!concavity effect. " The differenc e  in effort allocation for 
risk averse and risk neutral policies is schematically repres er.ted ir.. 
Figure 7�. ').'his difference measur@s ti1e chang.,_;; in effort caused
by transforming utility from a linear into a concave function of R, or 
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equivalently b y  changing Class I, II, a n d  Ill functions to Class IV,  V, 
ar.d VI functi.or.s r e s pectively. 
In each period , the decisi'Jn maker selects an allocatio:-i of 
effort based on the trade off between consuming a larg er portion of 
the current stock, but at the expense of r educing the expected future 
stream of returns frorn the fishery. Roughly, the optimal policy is 
to !i�:nit curr.::nt consumptio n  for small stoc'k s i z e s  wl::ere the fishing 
conditions are poor in return ior larger expected future revenues 
from the fishery once the population has increaaed. Of course for 
large:::- popuiations current consumption increases to take advantage 
of improved fishing conditions. 
Because of d ecr e asing marginal utility, the effe c t of 1uaking 
utility a conc?.ve {unction of R is to place g:ceater weight on ct:r.rent 
con3umptior: for small stock sizes where R t is typic a lly s1naL1, and 
l e s s  we.ight on consl1.':11pti.on for l arge:: populations z1he r e  R. is greater. ' 
Thi,; occurs because the addition to utility for a small increase in R
t 
is gre;;,.ter \Vhen returns are small, and vice versa. �<\nether desc ription 
of il:is effect, \Vhich we shall call the "concavity effect, " is that it tends 
to moderate or smooth out the consurr,ption poiicy «s a functi?n of stock 
size. That is , the difference in effort allocations and consumption 
rates corresponding to large and small population sizes is reduced by 
t:c-ansforming the c:.tility ftinc tion. This effect is quite pronounc ed for 
Classes I and III as illustrated in Figures 4 ani:i 6. 
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Figure 4·. Comparison of OptimE.i. Risk Averse, and Ri.sk Neutral 
Programs with Variable Depletion Rates for Cla s s e s I 
and IV 
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Figureb 6 .  Comparison of  Optimal Risk Averse and Risk Neutral
Programs ·with Variable Depletion Rates for Classes III 
and VI 
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Rl.sk NeutraL and Risk A v e r s e  Policies 
Notice that R
t 
is "- strictly concave functivn of E
t 
for Class II.
By argu1nents similar to those used above, \Ve expect a n1ore moderate 
c0nsumption poli.cy for II than for the othe:r Classes , I and III. Thi.s 
is Ye rified by examining Figures 4-6 .  Lri addition, the concavity effr:ct 
wi.11 Oe less pronounced for Class Il cases since Rt is already strictly
concave in E . t 
According to Figures 4 and 5, Class (I and IV) and (II and V )
programs tend t o  conver.�e t o  the same steady-state population. 
Because of the concavity effect, ri.sk averse programs general_ly 
converge to equilibrium at a slower rate than r i s k  neutral policies. 
For Cla s s  IE and IV progra;:ns, a S  depicted in Figure 6,
"cyclical" as opposed to "stea dy state" fishing is opi:in1al, The cycles 
are less pronounced for risk averse policies tha:n fo:r risk neutral 
programs due to the concavity effect. 
D. Effects of Increasing Uncertainty 
Ques tion 2 :  \Vhat is the effect on optimal consurnption strategies for 
increased uncertainty regarding prices, and depletion and growth 
rates ? 
To answer this question we analyze: changes in co:isumption 
policies for different distributions of prices, and g r owth and depletion 
rates. All these distributions be long to the clas s of mean-preserving 
spreads (the mean of the random variable ·is unchanged for ali distri-
butions), and are ordered according to how "risky'' or 'Uncertain ' '  
they are. J>.dopting the d1:;:finition of "increasing uncertainty" from 
Hadar and Russell (1969),  Hanoch and Levy ( 1 969}, and Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1970),  we say that one distribution, £, is more unce rtair:. 
than another, g, if 
J U (x) f(x) dx � J U(x} g (x)  dx (19)  
for all risk averte r s - - those with concave utility functions , U. It  can 
be shown22that (l9 ) is formally equivalent to 
TIY) 
b 
J (F(x) - G(x) ) dx, T(Y) � 0 and T(b) 
a 
0 (20) 
where F and G are the cum\!lalive density fu!1ctions car.responding 
to · f  and ·g , and it is as�u1ned that the points of increase for F and 
G are cor..taincd in the closed interval [ a, b] , 
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I,ooking at Table 3 the dL;tribution s ,  symn1etric unifo rm, 
syn>rr:etric, skewed right, and skewed left for each of the ran<lor.1 
parameters , pt ' 
Y] lt ' 
and 'lz t  are arranged according to the le ngth 
of the interval ever which the variable is allowed to range. It is eas y 
to verify that accordir..g to condition { 2 0 )  the distributions become more 
risky or uncertain as the range of variation for each of the par ameters 
inc::-ease. For exar:nple, the distribution of price is n1ore unc e r tain 
ior [Sym. U. , ( . 4, 1. 6)}  than it is fur [SynL U. , ( . 6, l. 4 ) ] ,  and 
[Skd. L. , (. 4, 1. 2 )} is rr:o re uncertain than (Skd. L. , ( . 6, 1 .  2 ) ]  . 
To sharpen our anaiys is we consider the effect of increasing 
uncertainty in two s e c tio11s - - the first dealing with r isk neutral social 
pLo.n.-rier s ,  2nd the second dea}.ing with risk averse social maximiz e r s .  
\Vithin each s ection e ffects o f  increased va riations in p1·ices and 
ir.,:::reased unce rtainty reg<J.rding depletion and gr owth rates ar� analyzed 
separately. From the results obtained here we can al so cornpar.e 
!."'es ource L! S C  unde r deterministic conditions with resource allocation 
in a stochastic environ:11ent \vb ere uncertainty exists about p ric es ,
anC. ·gro\vth and depl etion rate s . 
Increased Variation in Prices, Growth and De_-e_letion ·Rates 
Risk Neutral Soci2.l Planner 
Variations in p r ice h'1ve no effect on r e s ource allocation for 
the risk neutral social ma;;imizer as long as the expected price remains 
unchanged. 
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Changes in resource allocation for Classes I-III caused by 
increased uncertainty in growth and depletion rates are analyzed for 
all the cases of variatiohs listed in Table 3 for D, DG, and DG. 
Observation 4 :  For the risk neutral maximizer the effect o f  increased 
variation in gro\vth and depletion rates is chara.cterized by the follow-
ing comment s :  
a )  Increasing variation in growth and depletion rates tend to 
decrease the optimal allocation of effort and tile resultant 
catch corresponding to each population size. 
b) This dampening effect on effort is greatest for Classes 
and Ill rent functions. \Vithin each class, the effect is 
n1ore pronounce d. at the high end of the population scale 
wh�re catches are typically large. 
The effect of increasing uncertainty in the depletion rate on optimal 
programs for Classes I - III is represented in Figure s  8 - 1 0 .  
Comparing the small variation cases [Sym. U. , (. 6 ,  1 .  4 ) ]  wiL"h. 
the large variation s� '·uations [Sym. U. , ( . Z ,  1 .  8 ) ]  the change in effor
_t 
increases with greater absolute variation in catch. This variation is 
proportional to the expe cte d  catch L, since L = 11 kX E = T) L. 
t Z t  t t Z t  
i\ s  noted i n  Observation 4 ,  and looking a t  Figures 8 - 1 0 ,  
\Ve find that (1 )  the gr�at�st effoTt adjustment occurs for Classes 
and III programs , and (Z) within each class, cha:"tges in effort i nc reas e 
with population size. Note that the expected value and variation.in 
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catch is large for each oi these situation s .  Generally L increases 
with popul.:>.tion, <1nd corr:.pared to Glass II programs, lhe expected 
catch and the variation iri L are greater for Cla�;ses l and III po li­
t 
c;:ies particularly at the upper end of the population scale . 
Increased Variation in Prices, Growth �,nd Depletio:i. Rates:.­
Risk AverBe Social Planner 
The effect of increasing variation in price:>, growth and deple-
tion rates on Glass IV - VI programs are analyzed for all the P, D; 
DG, and DG variations listed in Table 3. 
Observation S: 
a. With increasing variation in prices or growth �nd depletion
rates, the allocation of effort and resultant expeC':ed catch for small 
(large} populations are the same or increasing (decreasing) for 
Classes IV and V .  
b. VVith increasing variation, the allocation of effort is  ge:ier.::Hy 
decreasing and more evenly distributed over population States for 
Class VI. 
c. The greatest change in effort caused by increasing uncertainty
in prices or gro\vth and depletion rates occurs for Glass e s  IV and VI. 
Changes in optimal prograrns for Class e s  IV - VI caused by 
increasing variation in depletion rates are presented. in Figures 1 1 - 1 3 .  
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A plhusible explanation £or oul· findings in Observ::tticn 5 is that the dis -
pe 1· s �on in rents , Rt' is propo::-tional to the s i z e  of the catch w·hen either 
pt 
or 11zt are random. For all programs the optimal catch generally 
increases with population. Since the decision inaker is averse to 
var:.ations in Rt he tends to increase his catch for s:rnall populations, 
despite poor fishing conditions , since the dispersion in returns is 
sm.aller, and to decrease his catch at larger populations, because of 
the greater disper s ion in rei-urns . 2 3 
Effort allocations are distributed more evenly over population 
Sizes for Clas ses II and \' than for the other c l a s s e s ,  dne to the con-
cavity of the rent function. Consequently, variations in the depletion 
rate, v.thich tend to even out effort allocations, have l e s s  irnpact 
e r,. Class V optimal prot;rams. 
?.. Ris ;.;  Adjusted Disc01:nting
Queo:.tion 3 .  I s  it possible to .;;ccount ior the social attitudes towards
r i s k  bearing in t.he social discount rate? 
This qi.:..es tion i.s not to be c 9nfused wi0th the issue of whether
or not private costs of risk bearing represent social costs as well, 
and should thl'refore be taken into account in judging the desirability
oi pt:blic projects . .P..ather, our concern is with evaluating different 
analytical methods for represent.ing risk aversion, assurnin<> that the 
va..riability in fishery rents is a s ocial cost that effects resource
allocation decisions. 
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An alternative t o  capturing attitudes for risk bearing i n  the 
form of the utility function, is to employ a "risk adjusted" interest 
rate for discou!lting future U:icertain returns, In this c a s e  the opti -
mal consumption strategy is determined by choo sing effort in each 
period to maximize the present value of fishery rents, 
2: 
t "' 0  
t 
s' e[RIX, , E,1 2' ] B
' 
---- , l + p 
I 2 1  I 
v1here the rate of dis count a inc1cdes a "risk premium" yield over 
2.nd above the "riskle s s " rate o:f in tere s t P -
In the literature on cost-benefit analysi s ,  by far the n1ost 
ccmr.1.on met'bod oi adjustir.g for risk is through the discount rate. 
Propcn<:nts u:f this procedure argue that the alternative of represent-
ing risk preferi.;nces with diffe rent forrn.s of the utility functions re-
qui::-es direct knowledge of consume .i 1 s  utility functions, and is  
therefore ;nore difficult to irnpien::ent.24 However, the simplicity of 
the present value cri';.eria in equation ( 2 1 ) 12. deceptive. In practice· i t  
is not e a s y  t o  determine the cori-ec
,t value of· :J ' .  Several n1ethods 
for' calcula.ting the social discount rate have been proposed, . but all of 
thern are d.ifiicult to implement.25 However, a n1orc s e rious objec tion 
t·? employing risk' adjusted discounting is that ri s k is not a sim?le 
compounding f.incti.on of En1e.26 For example, in our niodel , var-i.a-
tions in rent a r e  independent of t"ime and correspond to the size of thC' 
txpected catch when there is uncertainty about prices or the rate of 
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depletion. Our general conclusion, stated fo:nnally in Observation 6 
is that programs for exploitation of the fishery that are derived from 
maximizing the risk adj-q.sted present value of retl\rns , appearing in 
equation ( 2 i. )  are non(l)ptimal. 
Observation 6 :  For each type of variation in our model, P, D, DG, 
and DG, the re does not exist a · B, such that cI'.e solution to the 
problem 
Max 
Et 
2: B , t e [RIX . Et i i': ]
t = 0 t 
subject to Xt+l = X t + (11 1�(a - bXt)X t - ri2t kXtEtJ Z.
yields a set of E
t 
1s which are optin1al for the problem
Mz..x 
E
t 
2: n' e [U(R IX, . E,1 1 ] 2't = 0 • 
where U (R {Xt , Et ))  ln(G +R(Xt , Et)).
We .found that the effect of increasing the social discount 
rate p to account for increases in risk (equiYalent to decreasing the 
(22)  
discount factor, B),  for all prograrr.s, regardless o f  the type of utility 
function or parameter variations involved, was to ericourage a higher 
level of current consumption of the fishery resource for all population 
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s i z e s .  Intuitively, il seerns natural for s ociety to cons ume t� larger 
portion of the resource currently <.s future felicities become l e s s  
impor:ant. This is contr2.sted \Vith the alternative convention of 
repres enting risk preferences in the form of the utility .function. 
In this case current cons un1ption inc reases or remains the Same 
at small populations and decreases for large populatio-:-is as variations 
in price, depletion and growth rates increase ( s e c  Obs ervation 5 ) .
Unfortunately, i. n  our model, the sirnple app�·oach o f  increasing 
the discount rate to capt"urc ri s k is not operable. Th� reason for this 
,is clear. Risk is not ,o_ s �1nple compoundi.:-lg fun ction of time and 
s o  r,o overall ac'..jus tn1ent in the interest rate is suitccble .  O:i course, 
there is nothing to prc-clude us iro1n using a different rate for d i s -
count�ng returns in each pei·iod. The calculation of these r at e s would 
,require kr.owledge of the variation in returns which is proportional to 
the expec ted catch in each period. 1-lowever since this information is 
avail8-bl e ,  only after the optin1ai consumption progr.ams have been 
dete�rn.ined, the use of different disc ount rates to adjust for risk is 
not practical. 
TP.e difficulties with trying to account for r i s k  throug�1 the 
Ciacount rate are of cou!"se not peculiar to our analy.s i s ,  They occur 
whenever the ri�k a s s ociated with a particular project or activity i8
not a sir."1.pl.� c:ompoundl:--1g func tion of time. 1he v,:i..·iation in nel 
social returns for many consumption and production p r o c e s s e s  depends 
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on the level of the activity and not on the time during which it occurs.
For these types of projects, the use of risk adj1.isted dis c ounting is 
clearly inappropriate. 
F. Policy Conclusions 
Que stion 4 :  B a s e d  on the analysi s  of Questions 1 - 3  and our r e s ults 
concerning optimal r e s ource allocation for the fishery i n  a stochastic 
environment, what pr actica l poli cy recu1nmenda.tions ca!1 be n1ade for 
the yellowfin tuna fi shery? In particular, ( l ) how does the poticy of. 
maxiinizing the sustained phys ic a l  yield fron1 the fishery compare 
with optimal stochastic policies, (?. ) de the s olutions to deterministic 
problems yield a sufficiently good approximatior:. to the stochastic 
s olutions to ignore p:::obabilistic modeling all together, and (3)  what 
additional information and data· on the biological and e c onomic proc-
esses of the fishery would be most useful for resource management? 
Evaluation of h12_ximum Sustained Yield Policv under 
Stochastic Conditior_s 
Several agencies, including the Tur.a- Cornrr.iss io�J. advocate 
maxirr,izing the sustained physical yield from the fishery. Critic s of 
this policy a s s e r t  that there is no particular utility in pursuing this 
program since the economic oi: social value of the resource is ignored. 
Despite these attacks, the policy is still retained by ·rno s t  fishery 
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corr..rr.i.ssions becau s e  it  is deemed t o  be '\vol·kable. " The argun:�ent 
goes that if under the optimal economic program the stock converges
to a s teady-state size close to the n1aximum sustainable yield population, 
then the maximum yield poli.cy should be adopted since it _ts probably
easier ·for managers to follow and understand. 
We find several difficulties with the maxilnum yield policy 
even as a workable progran1, when considered in a stochastic frarnework. 
\Vith continual variations in the growth and the deplation rates, the popula-
t:or. is rare ly, if ever, in a steady state. The maxin1um sustained
yield policy is deficient in that it abstracts from the non s teady state 
or transient behavior of the fishery. However, even if the population 
tend:; to fluctuate around a certain stock size,  a.s it does for Class I,
!.I, IV, ar,d V progr<:.ms, this stock value will generally differ from the 
maximum sus tained yield populatio:r:. Of cou:rse , the concepts of
steady state vr maximum yield fishing are not applicable to Class III
and VI prog:ranJ.s since cyclical fishing is optiinal.·
Deterministic Resu lts as an Approximation to Stochastic
Soh.:.cion�-
Until only recently, econon1ists in particlllar and social 
scientists in general, have avoided <:.n explicit lreatment of probabi!-
istic models. Instead they have relied on detcrn1i.:1istic results to 
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provide a n  approximation for stochastic solutions .  The reason::; for 
this are clear. When uncertainty is introdc.ced into the analysi s ,  the
formulation of and sol'"-tion to most problems becomes rr.ore involved
and soinetimes unmanageable. Fi:i.ally, once the problem is r e s olved, 
the results of the stochasti c  model arc often of a subtle and obscure
nature and consequently are diffici.:.lt to interpret for the policy maker.
Besides this ,  there is the widel.Y held belief that most conclusions of
deterministic studies remain basically the san1e when a stochastic
treatment is employed. Indeed, if the probabili stic answer to pl.'.'ob� 
lems differs only s lightly from the detern1inisl:ic solution the large' 
investn1ent required for analyzing stochastic n1odels may not be 
warranted,
However, regardless of the extent to ·which solutions dif{er,
the adoption of stochastic methods is  desi1·abl€: i f  tliey effect  a n  in-
crease in the s·ocial returns from the resource that exceeds the
attendant costs of research. Formalizing thlcs notion we define the 
present value of the resource,
V
d
(XO) L s ' e[ u1R1x, . EdlX, )) l] L': t = 0 
to be the expected value of the sum of discounted utilities att2.in2.ble
from an initial population x0 and following a policy denoted by 1d ' .
A policy is a rule or  strategy for se lecting an effort allocation depend�
ing on the size of population, such that E: 
ia the optimal deterministic policy chosen to
E
d
(X ). Assume 1D'
t t 
max 
d 
L B t [ U (R (Xt , E� (Xt ) ) ) ] E. t ::;  0 
where price is non random; and 
X 1 = X + f(a - ·ox IX - kX E ] Z t+ t - t t t t 
Let 1 $ 1  be the optimum stochastic s t r ategy chosen to 
max I
d t = O
B t e [ U(R{X. , E,d (X. J ) ) ] E,
' . 
V>'here price may vary, and 
xt+l xt + ( T] l t (a - bXt)X t - "llz t kXt Et ] LS.
For a probabilistic enviror:ment, the inc1·ease in present value 
5 8  
( 2 3 )  
(24) 
achieved by emplvying an optin1al stochastic policy·, S, rather than 
tha deterministic consumption rule, D, i s  
vs1xo1 uD , , \X O )  (25 I 
Obvio•..:.::;:y, we are not prepared to rccornmend ·whether or not 
st�chastic rr:odeling of the yellovdin tuna industry is warranted 
based on the tyyJe 0£ cost-'t-(;l"iefi.t criteria suggested above. : lnforma-
tion on the ernpirical strucn:re of the fishery is incomplete, and the 
prograrns we are inves tigating unly simulate hypothe tical situations 
in the f:shery. Yet the following· obs ervations should provide us with 
a useful starting point for future policy analysis. 
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Obs ervation 7 :  For the uricertainty programs P, D ,  DG, and D G  the 
inc reases in the present value of the r e s ource :for a given initial popuw 
lation realized by employing the optilnal stoch:i.�1tic policy i s  
a ) greatest for Classes I ,  III, IV, and V I  and almost negligible 
for Classes .II and V,
b) increases with Iarger initial populations and, 
c) increases with greate·r variations in either price or the 
growth and depletion rate s ,
Examples of present value increas e s ,  c a lculated b y  €:.guation (25) 
and corresponding to Classes I and III fo1· ,,ari<'.ble depletion ri'..te pro-
grams are plotted i n  Figures 1 4  and 1 5 .  The additions to present vai\le 
for Clas s II pi.'ogr.,.ms are only of the order of :-nagnitude of 103 Collars.
Because our computer print outs were only desigi•ed to report r:u1neri-
cal results up to five significant figure s ,  the C.lass II figures are too 
small to report accurately. Sin1ilar computations for Classes IV - VI
are not included here because they are more difficult to interp.::-et, 
since present value fieures are in terms of natural logs. 
Looking at Figures 1 4 and 1 5  we see tI'.at present value in-
creases are· substantial for Classes I anQ. III, that they increase accord -
ing to the initial population size and that they b<�come larger as the 
' d  l . · · . 27 A l l · · rate o_ e p  et1on i s  more uncerta1n. s a genera r e s u  t ,  lt i s  not 
surprising to find that the magnitude of the present value increase
depends on the extent to which optimal stochastic and detern1inistic 
pol�cies differ. This explains the small increase for Clas..ses II and V,
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and tl:at the increase in present values are larger for prograrr1s sub-
ject to more uncertainty. 
At least for the ra::J.ge of paran1.eter values we have analyzed, 
sulutions to deterministic problems se:rve a6 excellent approximations 
ior stochastic solutions in the Clei.ss II and V cases. On- the other 
hand, our tentative conclusion for Classes I, III, IV, and VI is that a 
Frobabilistic treatmer,t of the resource allocation problem is needed 
,<.:ince deterministic consump:ion rule.s are poor substitutes for opti-
mc;.l stochastic s�r2.tegie s .  
Suggcs ti.ons for .'\.dC.itional Empirical Analysis 
With our Markov rr.odel \Ve have been able to assess the impact 
of various resource allocation prograrrui on th� fishery for a variety 
of different environn1ental and econornic conditions. In effect, new 
policies and decision rules for operating the fishery have been tested 
ur..der sim.l!lated conditions without running the risk of experimenting 
on the real systems . •  11.t the same time, our knowledge of the empiri­
cal str'.!cture of the fishery is only fragmentary. On the biological 
side, the nature 'of the variations i'n grov1th and depletion rates are as 
yet t:.n1'..nown, <'.r:.<l on the:: economic side, information on the .cost of 
:fishing effort and the social attituc!es tov:ard risk bearing is incom-
plete. 
Hopefuliy though, this study has yielded so.roe valuable in­
aights i'1.to which variables are more impor.tant than ·others in the 
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analysis of the fisher}r and which topics dese:-v.0: the highest priority in 
future research endeavors.  We have observed that optimal decision 
rules for operating the fishery are more sensitive to changes in cer­
tain variables and components of the n1.odel than others. This sort 0£ 
information indicates the types of biological and economic data that 
w�l l  p:rove to be most u seful for managing the fishery.
a. Biological Data 
Without knowing the frequency functions fo:: the rate of growth 
and depletion paramete r s ,  Tl,1 and 112 we have assu1ned that ti-.ey a:;e
distributed according to a uniform 01· triangula1· d""nsity function. If 
these serve as good approximations for the real distributions of ri1 
and 112 then our results indicate that we should be most concerned 
with gathering data to determine the range over which these para:n.e­
ters vary. We have observed t
.
hat the optimal consurr:.ption strategies 
are s ensitive to the amount o! variations in these pararr,eters. On the 
other hand, the tyr-E• oi distribution, whetber it be ur..iforJ.n or tri­
angular, S'{:nmetric or skewed does not seem to effect th!J: optimal 
decis_ion rules significantly. 
b. Economic Research
Our results indicate that optimal alloc<.>..tion policies differ 
according to the specification of the cost of effort function. In esti­
mating costs it will be particularly interes'!'i!'l.g to determine if mar­
ginal costs increase- with greater allocations of ef!ort, as is the case 
64 
for C l a s s e s  Il <o.nd V. Under these conditio!l.S we observed that deter­
ministic or cer t>.dnt}' equivalent policies provide excellent approxima­
tions ro optimal stochastic decision rules for the f'.shery. 
One should realize that in gathering cost data, for our pur­
poses effort is defined biologically in terms of efficiency �nits. It is 
a type of aggregate input which when applied to the fishery will remove 
o r  ca�ch, on average, a certz..in percentage of the population. The 
components corr:.p:tising a unit of effort need to be specified in order 
to e s timate the quantity of capital goods and labor services used in 
the fishing proc e s s .  }\.dditiona!ly, as with all cost e z timations, some 
care is needed to insure that one is measuring the true opportunity 
c o s t  oi inputs rather than the acc ounting cost.  This is particularly 
important in the yellowfin fishery, since the boats operating in this 
in<luotry hc.ve a number of alternative opportunities for employment 
in other fisheries as •,vell. 
Optimal decision rules are also sensitive to society's attitudes 
towa.i-d risk bearir.g. Our approach has been to represent risk pref­
el"er:ces ir. the form of the soci�l'w"'. tfare :function as opposed· to the 
more common, but as \Ve argued less valid proc ed\!re of adjusting for 
r i a k  lhrough the social discount rate. T"n e  problem of actually c sti­
rr1ating and p!'oviding a consistent repr..;sc ntation of social risk pref­
erences is a very C.ifficult one, and we shall not attempt to resolve it 
here. The object of our study is r.nuch more rnode s t :  to determine 
the effect of different attitudes for risk bearing on optin•al resource 
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allocation i n  the fishery. Beyond this, howeve.r, we have a few com­
ments pertaining to the choice of the social welio.re :function. 
Naturally the social attitudes towards va.riations in fishery 
rents will depend on how ·these rents are distributed among individuals 
i_n the e conomy, or for the case of an international :fishery, how they 
are dispersed. among tl:.e member countri e s .  Consequently, implicit 
in the choice of a social utility £Unction must be sor.ne provision for 
distribution of the fishery rents. At the s ame time, a_ number oi regu­
latory schemes to prevent individuals fron) over exploiting the !i.she:ry 
have been proposed,  including quota ar.d lice nsi.ng systems, each 
r esulting i n  a different distribution of rents. This suggests that the 
f;v.To problems of: ( 1 )  :form1.ilating optimal consur:.ption rules based on 
maximizing expected social utility and, ( 2 )  devi.si:r..g schemes to en­
force these rules, must be· solved simultaneou�.ly, as they are inter­
r e lated. The type of regulatory proccdu.:-e will have an impact on 
distribution, which in turn will effect the choice of tbe soci.al welfare 
function.28 
Once the means for dividing the r e tur r..s has been established 
the problem of choosing a welfare function that reflects social risk 
preferences still remains. The idea of constructing an aggregated 
social weliare function from a weighted sunl. of individual utility func­
tions is perhaps theoretically possibL�,29 but in1practical. It appears
. 
to us that the choice might best be made politically. For example, 
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us ing our !Yiarkov Decision model, o n e  could determi!'.e variou5 opti-
mal «.Uocation pla1:s for the fishery derived b y  ma.ximizing different 
social weliare criteria. These plans could then b e  reviewed and voted 
on by an electorate composed of individuals (countries),  who were to 
xeceive a share o f  the l' ents from the fisherY . 
C. S�r.n�nc..ry St::<ternents 
T:;e effect o f  uncertainty rega!"ding pric e s ,  and g r owth ancl deple-
tion rates on optirnal al.location strategies have been analyzed ior 
situations where society is averse and indifferent to variations in the 
r e tur'ns from the fishery. The impact of unce;:-t o..inty on consumption 
p1·ograms is directly related t o  the arnount of variation in fishery 
rer..ts detel"mined by the size of the expected catch and the degree of 
fluctuation in the pric� and depletion rates. The variability of r e nU; 
increases with population since the expected catch i s  typically greater. 
Key char.ges in optimzi l  effort atlocations occurring in a stochasti.c 
environment fer difie rent popuiations are of the foliowir.g forrn: 
For the risk nc:1tral social planner, the allocation of effort 
anq tfie resultant expected catch tend to remain constant or decrease 
as the; price anC growth and depletion ratr:: s become more un:c e rtain. 
The largest cha:1� c s  i n  effort take place at the '..lpper end o.f the popu-
lation scale, The risk averse fishery tnanag e r  increases effort at 
s1nall populations to take 2dvantc..ge of the s:nall fhtctuatiuns in :-cnts,  
and decreases effort fo:- larger popu lations to avoid greater risk in 
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returns. The effect of uncertainty on optimal C l a s s  .il and V programs 
is r e latively ineignificc:nt since the allocations o f  effort,  expect.::d· 
catches, and thus the fluctuations in rents are smal! compared to the 
other classes. 
The qualitative nature of our results are the same for all dif-
£erent forms of the frequency function analyzed. . The tno s t  important 
e!ement of the parameter distributions affecting allocation strategies 
is the range over which the variables are allowed to fluctuate. Opti-
mal effort allocations corresponding to variable deptetion rate cases 
are affected only slightly by allowing s i multaneous variatio::i i n  the 
natural growth rate. 
The policy implications evolving from this analysis are :  
(1)  The policy o f  maximizing the sustainable physical yield from ti:e 
fishery, currently followed by the Tufla Commission, i s  not an 
efficient device for alloc ating . resources u�der dete rrninistic or s t o -
chastic conditions. The policy should be retained only i f  the ?Ohtical 
and � ocial costs o f.  switching t o  a new program a:·e prohibit:.ve. 
(2) Using the discount rate to capture risk is inappropriat_e since risk 
i s  not a simple compounding iunction of tii:ne and no overall adjust-
ment in the interest rate i s  suitable. (3) Solutions to determini s � i c
problems serve as excellent approximations ior stochastic solutions 
in Class II  and V c a s e s .  How.ever, for the other classes a probabil-
iatic treatment of the resource a·llocation problem is needed sini..:e 
deterministic consurnption rules are poor subs titutes for optimal 
stochastic strategies. 
l .  
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FOOTNOTES 
The e conon1ic management of nonrenewable resources llnder 
deterrninistic conditions is ciiscllssed in Hotelling ( 1 9 3 1  ), Gordon 
{ 1 9 67), Herfind2.hl ( 1 9 6 7 ) ,  Scott ( 1 9 6 7 ), Cun1mings and Burt ( 1 969),  
.A. nderson ( 1 972}, Yousden ( 1 973), Smith ( 1 9 74),  an d Schmalensee 
(l 975 ). 
The n1an;:q:;ement 0£ renew<�ble resources is and.lyzed by C ri.:..tchfield 
and Z·:!llner ( 1 9 6 2 ) ,  Plourde ( 1 9 70) and ( 1 9 7 1 ) ,  Quirk and Smith 
( 1 970 ),  Cl.ark ( 1 97 3 ) ,  S?encc ( 1 9 7 3 ) ,  Brown ( 1 974) and Neher ( 1 974).  
),'otc.bl.c exceptions arc Ee<::.l and Dasgupta ( 1 974) and Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz { 1 9 7 5 )  \vho consider the optimal exploitation of an exhaustible 
l·esource when there is unce1·tainty about the <lat('. when backup 
res ou,rces become available. 
2 .  ·For exan1ple, s e e  th8 discuss ion b y  Scott ( 1 9 6 7 ,  p .  2 6 ) .  
3 . The mo.st i:nportant feature ;.; f  this prog r�n1ming approac;h is the 
ease \�·ith which elements of unCe rtainty are incorporated into the 
model. Stochastic elements are not accommodated at all in the 
control theory models used in the li.terature. For a mor.e complete 
discussion 0£: this poi!lt see Lewis ( 1 9 7 5 ) ,  p. 1 0 .
4 . The E2..stern Paci.fie yellowfin tuna fishery i s  o�e of few inter­
nc..tional fisheries where the rate of fishing has been effectively 
5 .  
6. 
7. 
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controlled by a regulatory body, in this case the Inter-American 
Tropical Tuna Commission (LA TTC). For management purposes 
IA TTC collects and 2n.n.lyzes data on the fishery s o  that the yellow­
fin tuna is one of the· most extensively studied populations in the 
world. Besides the obvious reason that tuna is a valuable resource, 
I decided to s tudy this fishery because of tbe availability o f  
reliable biological data. 
In terms of mineral and petroleurr, reserves, Tlzt might desc ribe 
the effect on extraction rates for varying n1ining and drilling 
conditions. Normally, we as sume f(Xt) = 0 for nonrenev..·able 
resources although nearly all mineTals, natural gases and oils,  
generally conceived of being fixed in supply are replenishable 
given enough time. 
See Lewis ( 1 9 75),  pp. 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 .
The difficulties o f  obtaining costs o f  operation data from boat 
o\vners is discussed in Gre'en and Broadh(';ad ( 1 9 64).  
8. .For example, 00rbach ( 1 9 7 5 )  no�es that ·boats in di.fferent areas
9. 
of the Eastern Pacific Tuna Fishery rely on each oth e r  for infor­
mation about the location of schools of fish. 
For a description of the pu!·se s e i..'1e fishing techr.ology, s e e  
Green, Perrin, and Petrich ( 1 9 7 1 ). 
1 0 .  Arrow and Lind ( 1 9 7 0 )  sh6w that when the risks a s s ociated with 
any project are dis tributed among a large numbE;r of people s o  
that the size of the share bo1·ne b y  each individual i s  a very small 
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component of hb; income, the total costs of risk bearing are 
negligible. 
1 1 . Conditions under \.vhich "group preferences " can be repres ented 
i..'1 the form ap;:iearing in eqaation ( 1 1 )  are discuss cd in Wilson 
( 1 9 6 8 ) .  
1 2 .  Recently the Corr,1.nission has i'1creased catch quotas t o  allo'.v 
the populatior- to reach a smaller size. This was done to obtain 
more inforn.;.ation or. the populatic.'.n dyn:an1i.cs o[ the stock. 
1 3 .  Unl e s s  E�i i:; given by technological or economic constraints, 
it is logically dete rr:.1i::i.ed by the follo•_v Lng res triction on the total 
ce:.tch dl.'.ring each tin1e period. Clearly, the total catch cannot 
exce,od the size of tho stock available at the beginning of the 
period, i. e .  
-6.kXtEt < 
implying that Et ::_ 6°k 
x t 
M, 
Ei " ·
14 • •  I\ linecu· progr2.mr:ning approach, .i:irst suggested ·by Manne in 
"Linear Progran1min.g and Seq�ential Decisions, 11 Mana_g_ement 
Science 6, r,o .  3, pp. 25g _ (i 7  { 1 960) ,  is also available fay solving 
the lvfarkov decision problen1. 
1 5 .  An important example V..'here price fluctuations are quite large 
and are believed to have a significant impact o;; resource allocation 
occur·s in the Per..ivian Anchovy Fishery; see Segura ( 1 9 7 2 ) .  
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1 6 .  Unfortunately, the problcn1 of insufficient data is n o t  peculic.r to 
the yellowfin tuna fishery. To my knowledge, at the present tin:.e 
there is little available information to e s tirnate these frequency 
distributions for any of the ocean fisherie s .  
1 7 .  To m y  knowledge the effects o f  seasonal variation e n  the fishery 
have not been analyzed in the fishery economics lite::atur e .  
Despite its title, the paper .by Bradley (19/ '0)  entitled 1'Some 
Seas onal Models of the Fishing Industry11 C!oes not deal with 
seasonal va:!.'iation either. 
1 8. Some interesting examples of multiple species r.i.odel s appear in 
Quirk and Smith ( 1 969}  2.nd Lampe ( 1 9 6 7 ) .
1 9 .  For simplicity all results will b e  illustrated '.vith examples o f  
depletion progran1s as suming symmetric uniform distributions, 
although our observations apply to all the programs listed in 
Table 3 .  
20. In equilibrium ( a - bX)X '°' kXE o r  E = �-I< bX ) . Equili.brh::m 
values for E '.:Lre represented by points on tl-.e 1'Steady State Effort" 
line in each figure.
21. Please note that the scale for ei:Eort on the vertical axis of all 
g raphs corre sponding to Classes II 'and V is enlarged. 
22. See Rothschild and Stiglitz ( 1 9 7 0 ) .
23.  This i s  partially offset by the fact that the utility function 
U(R) = ln (R -r G) displays decreasing absolute risk aversion, 
7 2  
Thi;s a s  R i:r:ccrease>", the ;:oesource manage r should become l e s s  
averse to risk. 
24. For a discussion of this point r;ee Hirshleifer and Shapiro (1 970).
25. 0:1. this point s e e  Ba-umol ( 1 97 0 ) and Hirshleifer and Shapiro ( 1 9 7 0 ) .
2() .  S e e  Prest and Turvey ( l 9 6 S ) .  
2 7 .  Althou gh t:ie a.b.'3ol-i;.te £ncreasc in Present value i s  large for Class I 
p rograrn s ,  the percentage increc.se is l e s s  than l percent .. However, 
ior the Class III prog rams i:he pe rcentage increases range from 
l percent to 30 percent. 
23. _-'\.r..other approach would be to consider the fishery as a private 
firm with sh3.rcholcl c r s .  Recent results on the theory of the firm 
i.!nder uncert2.inty obtained by Ekern and \Vil son ( 1 974), Leland ( 1 974),
Radnor ( 1 974} and Fvrsythe ( 1 97 5 )  suggest that maximizing the 
markyt value of tlHo fishery might be appropriate even \Vi th incomplete 
markets for risk.
29 . .  See "\Vil son ( 1 968).  
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